Mercer Law Review
Volume 69
Number 2 Articles Edition

Article 8

3-2018

To Deceive or not to Deceive: Law Enforcement Officers Gain
Broader Approval to use Deceptive Tactics to Obtain Voluntary
Consent
Alex G. Myers

Follow this and additional works at: https://digitalcommons.law.mercer.edu/jour_mlr
Part of the Criminal Law Commons, and the Criminal Procedure Commons

Recommended Citation
Myers, Alex G. (2018) "To Deceive or not to Deceive: Law Enforcement Officers Gain Broader Approval to
use Deceptive Tactics to Obtain Voluntary Consent," Mercer Law Review: Vol. 69 : No. 2 , Article 8.
Available at: https://digitalcommons.law.mercer.edu/jour_mlr/vol69/iss2/8

This Casenote is brought to you for free and open access by the Journals at Mercer Law School Digital Commons.
It has been accepted for inclusion in Mercer Law Review by an authorized editor of Mercer Law School Digital
Commons. For more information, please contact repository@law.mercer.edu.

Casenote
To Deceive or not to Deceive: Law
Enforcement Officers Gain Broader
Approval to use Deceptive Tactics
to Obtain Voluntary Consent*
"Seldom, very seldom, does complete truth belong to any human
disclosure; seldom can it happen that something is not a little
disguised, or a little mistaken."'
I. INTRODUCTION
In the modern era of criminal investigations, law enforcement
officers use many tactics from their bag of tricks to catch criminals.
One such tactic, deception, 2 has long been used to lull suspects into a

*I would like to thank Professor James Fleissner for his willingness to serve as my
faculty advisor for this Casenote. This work would not have been possible without his
immense dedication to the law, the numerous conversations that we had, or his continuous
challenging of my thoughts throughout this process. Furthermore, I would like to thank my
fianc6, Audra Kathleen Vaughters, for always supporting me and pushing me through the
stressful and rollercoaster-of-a-ride experience that is law school. To my father, Dr.
Whitney Lee Myers, I would like to say thank you for always supporting me and allowing
me to make my own path in life. And finally, I would like to dedicate this Casenote in
memory to the woman that has always been near to my heart and my guide throughout life,
my late mother, Cheryl Ann Myers.
1. JANE AUSTEN, EMMA 470 (Richard Cronin & Dorothy McMillan eds., Cambridge
University Press 2005) (1815).
2. Deception, BLACK's LAW DICTIONARY (10th ed. 2014). Deception is defined as both
"[tihe act of deliberately causing someone to believe that something is true when the actor
knows it to be false" and the employment of "[a] trick intended to make a person believe
something untrue." Id.
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false sense of security. 3 Another tactic, voluntary consent, 4 is widely
used to gain permission to search suspects or their premises. 5 While
such tactics are prevalent, they must not run into conflict with the
United States Constitution. Specifically, the Fourth Amendment of the
United States Constitution6 provides that "[t]he right of the people to be
secure in their persons, houses, papers, and effects, against unreasonable
searches and seizures, shall not be violated."7 Yet how can the use of
deception be reasonable under the Fourth Amendment to gain voluntary
consent? At the heart of United States v. Spivey8 lies the intersection of
deception and voluntary consent. Specifically, "whether deception by
law enforcement necessarily renders a suspect's consent to a search
of a home involuntary" was the key consideration of the opinion of the
United States Court of Appeals for the Eleventh Circuit.9 The court
of appeals answered the question in the negative. 10 Consequently, the
court significantly broadened the approval for law enforcement
officers to use deception to gain voluntary consent.
II. FACTUAL BACKGROUND"
Mr. Eric Spivey and Ms. Chenequa Austin became crime victims
on November 6 and 23, 2014, when an individual burglarized their
south Florida home twice. Spivey and Austin individually reported
the burglaries to local police on two separate occasions. Law
enforcement never informed the couple that they had arrested a
suspect for the burglaries.1 2 Unbeknownst to the couple, the burglar
began cooperating with law enforcement, stating that upon entering
the home he saw substantial evidence of credit-card fraud.' 3

3. See generally 4 WAYNE R. LAFAVE, SEARCH AND SEIZURE § 8.2(m)-(n) (5th ed. 2016).
4. Consent, BLACK's LAW DICTIONARY (10th ed. 2014). "[V]oluntary consent ...
[is
c]onsent that is given freely and that has not been coerced." Id.
5. See LAFAVE, supra note 3, at § 8.1.
6. U.S. CONST. amend. IV.
7. Id.
8. 861 F.3d 1207 (11th Cir. 2017).
9. Id. at 1210.
10. See id. at 1211.
11. The underlying facts of this case are illustrated in United States v. Spivey, No. 1560082-CR-DIMITROULEAS, 2015 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 189384 (S.D. Fla. Aug. 11, 2015), and
Initial Brief of Appellant Eric Jermaine Spivey, Spivey, 861 F.3d 1207 (No. 15-15023-BB)
[hereinafter Spivey Brief].
12. Caleb Hunt was arrested for the burglaries on December 6, 2014, by members of
the Sunrise Police Department (SPD). Spivey, 2015 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 189384, at *2.
13. Spivey, 861 F.3d at 1211; Spivey, 2015 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 189384, at *2.
Additionally, the burglar stated that he was interested in the couple's home due to
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After the burglar's revelations, two law enforcement agents of the
South Florida Organized Fraud Task Force (SFOFTF)-Secret
Service Agent (SSA) Lanfersiek of the United States Secret Service
(USSS) and Detective (Det.) Iwaskewycz of the Lauderhill Police
Department (LPD)-began investigating the suspected credit-card
fraud. 14 To that point, no law enforcement had followed up on either
of the burglary reports. The agents decided to use the lack of follow
up as a pretext for gaining entry to the home. 15
Austin, seeing the agents approach, warned Spivey to hide certain
incriminating evidence; Spivey hid a card reader-writer in the oven.
Austin answered the door and the agents represented their purpose
as following-up on the filed burglary reports. Det. Iwaskewycz
introduced himself and concealed SSA Lanfersiek's identity by
stating that SSA Lanfersiek was a crime-scene technician with the
LPD.16 After these representations, Austin invited the agents into the
residence. The agents' actual purpose was to investigate credit-card
fraud.17 Neither agent informed the couple that the burglar had been
arrested.18

After admitting the agents, the couple began cooperating,
contributing copious amounts of information to aid in the burglary
investigation.19 Additionally, Austin led the agents along the

the large amount of high-end merchandise located at the residence. Spivey, 861 F.3d
at 1211.
14. Spivey, 861 F.3d at 1211. The SFOFTF is a federally-funded Financial Crimes Task
Force (FCTF) of the USSS, pairing USSS special agents with local law enforcement. See id.
at 1221 (Martin, J., dissenting); see also Investigation, UNITED STATES SECRET SERVICE,
https://www.secretservice.gov/investigation/#field (last visited Dec. 19, 2017).
15. Spivey, 2015 U.S. LEXIS 189384, at *2. Evidence was present to show that SSA
Lanfersiek and Det. Iwaskewycz deliberately planned the ruse to gain entry to the couple's
home with the assistance of upwards of ten other SFOFTF members. Specifically, in the
planning session for the ruse, it was decided that the burglary reports would be used as the
general pretext for a search and that SSA Lanfersiek's identity would be concealed via a
costume portraying him as a crime-scene technician. Furthermore, the agents planned to
use the evidence seen under the ruse to gain further consent from the couple to search the
rest of the residence. The scheme also included a "plan B" that consisted of an assistant
state attorney on standby to obtain a search warrant in the event that neither Spivey nor
Austin consented to the search. Spivey, 861 F.3d at 1218-19 (Martin, J., dissenting).
16. SSA Lanfersiek wore a police jacket as a part of the costume to conceal his identity
and encourage Spivey and Austin to consent to the search. Additionally, Det. Iwaskewycz
displayed a gun and badge. Spivey, 861 F.3d at 1211 (majority opinion).
17. Id. at 1210-11.
18. Spivey, 2015 U.S. LEXIS 189384, at *7.
19. For example, Austin offered surveillance footage of the burglary, which Spivey
showed the agents. Spivey, 861 F.3d at 1211; Spivey, 2015 U.S. LEXIS 189384, at *3. The
surveillance video, produced by Spivey and Austin, was not in fact used to apprehend a
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burglar's path through the home. 20 Yet, this tour was only offered
after persistent questioning by SSA Lanfersiek about where the
burglar went in the home and whether he could see those areas. 21
Throughout the entire ruse investigation, SSA Lanfersiek
maintained his disguise as a crime-scene technician by pretending to
brush areas for latent prints. 22 Furthermore, both agents observed
significant evidence of credit-card fraud. 23 At this point, the agents
ended their ruse and separated the couple. 24
First, Det. Iwaskewycz took Austin outside the home and informed
her of the real reason for the agents' presence: to investigate creditcard fraud. Det. Iwaskewycz then asked about the card-embossing
machine found in the bedroom. 25 Austin stated that she and Spivey
found the machine when they moved into the home and assumed that
it had been left by the prior owner. 26 Unconvinced, Det. Iwaskewycz
determined that Austin would no longer cooperate or provide consent
to a full search. 27 He contacted a colleague in the LPD to run a
background check on Austin, which revealed an unrelated
28
outstanding warrant. Det. Iwaskewycz promptly arrested Austin
29
and removed her from the scene.
Then, the agents turned their focus to Spivey, who remained inside
the home with SSA Lanfersiek. Notwithstanding the agents'
disclosure that the burglary investigation was merely a ruse to
remained
Spivey
fraud,
credit-card
suspected
investigate

suspect for the burglary; however, it was used in the prosecution of Caleb Hunt, the prior
arrested burglary suspect turned informant. Spivey, 861 F.3d at 1211; Spivey, 2015 U.S.
LEXIS 189384, at *3.
20. Spivey, 861 F.3d at 1211; Spivey, 2015 U.S. LEXIS 189384, at *3.
21. Spivey, 861 F.3d at 1219 (Martin, J., dissenting).
22. Id. at 1211 (majority opinion). Some evidence showed that the facade was not overly
convincing as Agent Lanfersiek apparently did not know how to dust for fingerprints. Id.
at 1219 (Martin, J., dissenting).
23. This evidence included "a card-embossing machine, stacks of credit cards and
gift cards, and large quantities of expensive merchandise such as designer shoes and
iPads." Id. at 1211 (majority opinion).
24. Id. at 1219 (Martin, J., dissenting).
25. Id.
26. Id. at 1211 (majority opinion); Spivey, 2015 U.S. LEXIS 189384, at *4.
27. Austin apparently became upset and refused to further cooperate with the
investigation by the agents. Spivey Brief, supra note 11, at 7.
28. Spivey, 861 F.3d at 1219 (Martin, J., dissenting).
29. Id. at 1211 (majority opinion). Counsel for Spivey characterized Austin's arrest and
removal from the scene as being "hauled away." Spivey Brief, supra note 11, at 7.
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cooperative. 30 The agents informed Spivey of his rights, after which
he signed two consent forms to a full search of the residence. During
the search, agents found drugs, high-end merchandise, a loaded
handgun, a second card-embossing machine, seventy-five counterfeit
credit cards, and the card reader-writer that Spivey originally hid in
the oven. 31 Spivey was not arrested at the scene, but was taken to the
LPD police station for further questioning. He was later arrested
after incriminating statements were made by Austin. 32
A
grand
jury
indicted
the
couple
for
violations
of

Sections 1028A(a)(1)-(2)

33

and 1029(a)-(b) 34 of title eighteen of the

United States Code (U.S.C.), bringing five counts each for credit-card
fraud and aggravated identity theft.35 Spivey was also indicted for

violations of 18 U.S.C. §§ 922(g)(1)

36

and 924(e)(1) 37-possessing

a

38

firearm as a convicted felon.
In the United States District Court for the Southern District of
Florida, Austin filed a motion to suppress evidence relating to the
search of her home. 39 She argued that the evidence gathered by the
agents should be suppressed as the fruit of fraud in the entry of her
home, vitiating any consent. 40 The district court denied the motion,
noting that the couple voluntarily encountered the agents because
they were motivated to retrieve their fraudulently gained property,
and that the agents did have some legitimate justification for being
in the home. 4 1 Subsequently, both Spivey and Austin conditionally pled

30. The district court found that Spivey was motivated to retrieve the property stolen
from him and was even willing to risk prosecution for credit-card fraud to achieve that goal,
Spivey, 2015 U.S. LEXIS 189384, at *8-9. Furthermore, the district court noted that Spivey
believed that he could talk his way out of any predicament. Id.
31. Spivey, 861 F.3d at 1211-12.
32. Spivey Brief, supra note 11, at 8. While law enforcement spent hours thoroughly
conducting a search of the couple's residence, Austin was in custody at the police station.
This gave her ample time to make incriminating statements and actually assist in the
investigation. Id. at 7-8.
33. 18 U.S.C. § 1028A(a)(1)-(2) (2017).
34. 18 U.S.C. § 1029(a)-(b) (2017).
35. Spivey Brief, supranote 11, at 2.
36. 18 U.S.C. § 922(g)(1) (2017).
37. 18 U.S.C. § 924(e)(1) (2017).
38. Spivey Brief, supra note 11, at 2.
39. Spivey, 2015 U.S. LEXIS 189384, at *1.
40. Spivey, 861 F.3d at 1212. The motion to suppress was subsequently adopted by
Spivey. Spivey, 2015 U.S. LEXIS 189384, at *1.
41. Spivey, 2015 U.S. LEXIS 189384, at *7-8, 10. The district court additionally noted
that the evidence was admissible because the agents would have likely seen evidence of
credit-card fraud in plain view, even if the agents' presence was predicated on the sole
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guilty to the charges, reserving the right to appeal the denial of their
motion to suppress. Spivey and Austin were sentenced to seventy months
and thirty-six months in prison respectively, both also receiving three
years of supervised release. The couple appealed the denial of their
motion to suppress. 42
On appeal, the couple asserted that the deceptive tactics used to
gain consent to enter and search the home were egregious, falsely
misleading them "into believing that the [agents] were there to 'assist
them,' not to 'bust them."'4 3 The court of appeals, in a 2-1 decision,
affirmed the denial of the motion to suppress, holding not all
deceptive tactics invalidate voluntary consent. 44 The couple filed a
petition to rehear the case en banc 45 that was denied pursuant to a
poll of the judges of the Eleventh Circuit. 46
III. Legal Background
Searches conducted outside of the judicial process of a warrant "are
per se unreasonable under the Fourth Amendment--subject only to a
few specifically established and well-delineated exceptions." 47
Voluntary consent is one such exception.48
A. The Voluntary Consent Exception Defined
For the Government to use evidence obtained via a consent search, the
consent must be freely and voluntarily given. 49 The consent must not be

purpose to investigate the burglaries, and Spivey's later consent ratified the search that
was already conducted, thereby alleviating any illegality in the original search or
procurement of consent. Id. at *8-9.
42. Spivey, 861 F.3d at 1212.
43. Id. at 1214.
44. Id. at 1218. The case was heard before a three-judge panel, including Circuit
Judges Boggs, Martin, and William Pryor. The Honorable Danny Boggs, a Circuit Judge
for the United States Court of Appeals for the Sixth Circuit, sat by designation. Id. at 1209
& n.*.
45. Corrected Joint Petition for Rehearing En Banc, Spivey, 861 F.3d 1207 (No. 1515023-BB).
46. United States v. Spivey, 870 F.3d 1297, 1298 (11th Cir. 2017). An active judge of
the Eleventh Circuit requested a poll on the question and a majority of the active judges
voted against granting a rehearing of the case. Id.
47. Katz v. United States, 389 U.S. 347, 357 (1967).
48. See Davis v. United States, 328 U.S. 582, 593-94 (1946); Zap v. United States, 328
U.S. 624, 630 (1946).
49. See LAFAVE, supra note 3, at § 8.1.
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the product of coercion. 50 For instance, in Schneckloth v. Bustamonte,5 1
the Supreme Court of the United States considered the impact of duress
and coercion on consent. 52 During a routine traffic stop, 53 the driver of a
vehicle was unable to produce identification. Officers then asked if any
of the other five occupants could produce identification. Only one
occupant, Joe Alcala, was able to comply. Alcala gave permission to
search the vehicle upon request from the officers, and even helped
conduct the search.54 Subsequently, the officers found several stolen
checks.55 The Court reasoned that voluntariness lies on a spectrum,
acknowledging the need for law enforcement questioning at one end and
society's aversion to unfair, or even brutal, police tactics on the other.56
Courts must look to all of the relevant facts to understand whether a
suspect's consent was voluntary and not the product of coercion or
duress.5 7 As such, the Court held that if, after examining all of the
relevant facts, the suspect's consent was the product of duress or
coercion, then the consent is involuntary.58
The factual question of voluntariness is guided by an examination of
the totality of the circumstances.59 For example, in United States v.
Chemaly,6 0 Drug Enforcement Administration (DEA) agents were
contacted by an informant. The informant indicated that a man named
50. See generally Johnson v. United States, 333 U.S. 10 (1948); Amos v. United States,
255 U.S. 313 (1921).
51. 412 U.S. 218 (1973).
52. Id. at 223.
53. The officer originally stopped the vehicle after observing that both a headlight and
license plate light were burned out. Id. at 220.
54. Alcala, the front seat passenger, further explained that the vehicle in question was
his brother's car. Id.
55. Id. at 219-20. Following the denial of his motion to suppress evidence relating to
the checks, Bustamonte was tried for and convicted of possessing stolen checks with an
intent to defraud. Id. at 220.
56. Id. at 224-25.
57. Id. at 232-33. The Supreme Court ultimately reversed the United States Court of
Appeals for the Ninth Circuit, holding that the California Supreme Court properly
examined the voluntariness analysis in affirming Bustamonte's conviction. Id. at 248-49.
Justice Douglas, dissenting, felt that the majority placed far too much weight on the verbal
assent given by Joe Alcala. Id. at 276 (Douglas, J., dissenting). Specifically, Douglas
emphasized that verbal assent to a "search does not [conclusively] imply that the suspect
knew that the alternative of a refusal existed." Id. at 275.
58. Id. at 248 (majority opinion). Justice Douglas followed the Ninth Circuit, which
stated, "Under many circumstances a reasonable person might read an officer's 'May r as
the courteous expression of a demand backed by force of law." Id. at 275-76 (Douglas, J.,
dissenting) (quoting Bustamonte v. Schneckloth, 448 F.2d 499, 701 (9th Cir. 1971)).
59. Id. at 227 (majority opinion).
60. 741 F.2d 1346 (11th Cir. 1984).
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Chemaly would be carrying over $500,000 in a cardboard box61 through
United States Immigration and Customs (U.S. Customs) 62 at Miami
International Airport (MIA). After arriving at the airport, DEA agents
were unable to find an individual meeting Chemaly's description. 63 As
such, agents paged him to the ticket stand. After coming to the ticket
stand, Chemaly was taken to a screening area6 and asked if he was
carrying large quantities of money. Chemaly stated he was not carrying
a large sum of money and surrendered his passport and ticket to an
agent. The agent then asked to search Chemaly's bags. Chemaly agreed
and the agent discovered a large sum of money.65 The Eleventh Circuit
stated that relevant factors in a totality of the circumstances analysis
include following:
[Voluntariness of the defendant's custodial status, the presence of
coercive [law enforcement] procedure, the extent and level of the
defendant's cooperation with [law enforcement], the defendant's
awareness of his right to refuse to consent to the search, the
defendant's education and intelligence, and, significantly, the
defendant's belief that no incriminating evidence will be found.66

61. The informant originally described the box as large enough to hold a TV set or
electrical equipment and hold enough money to purchase cocaine. On a subsequent call, the
informant detailed the package as a brown box with either yellow tape or ribbon. Id. at
1348.
62. U.S. Customs is monitored by the United States Customs and Border Protection
(CBP) division of the United States Department of Homeland Security (DHS). See Miami
International Airport, International Arrivals, MIAMI-AIRPORT.coM, http://www.miamiairport.com/international-travel-arrivals.asp (last visited Dec. 19, 2017); U.S. Customs and
Border Protection, CPB.Gov, https://www.cbp.gov/ (last visited Dec. 19, 2017).
63. Upon arriving at MIA, the DEA agents determined that Chemaly was traveling on
Flight 23 to Aruba. However, the agents were unable to spot an individual carrying the
described package. Chemaly, 741 F.2d at 1348.
64. After being paged, Chemaly identified himself to the ticket stand for Flight 23;
however, he was not carrying the package. Chemaly was standing in a group of men, next
to a man carrying the package. Upon inspection, the yellow package was innocent and
everyone in the group was allowed to board their plane, except Chemaly. Id.
65. Id. at 1348-49. Chemaly was the last to be searched and disclosed that he was
carrying $4,900 in $100 bills on his person. Agents then asked to search his attache case
and Chemaly consented. This search revealed a package containing $10,000. A subsequent
pat-down of Chemaly brought an additional $10,049 from his pockets and wallet. In total,
Chemaly had $24,949, well in excess of the $5,000 declaration requirement of 31 U.S.C. §
1101. Chemaly was charged with making a false statement to a customs officer and failing
to declare money totaling an amount in excess of $5,000. Id. at 1349. The Southern District
of Florida denied Chemaly's motion to suppress and subsequently found him guilty on all
counts. Id.
66. Id. at 1352 (quoting United States v. Phillips, 664 F.2d 971, 1023-24 (5th Cir.1981)
(Unit B), cert. denied, 457 U.S. 1136 (1982)).
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67
The court recognized that no single factor is outcome determinative.
Accordingly, the court determined that by retaining his passport and
ticket, sequestering him from other passengers, and failing to inform him
of his rights, the agent coerced Chemaly, vitiating any consent.68
Accordingly, deceptive tactics are an important consideration in the
analysis of voluntariness. 69

B. Deception and its Impact on Voluntariness
Much like the concept of voluntariness, the properness of deceptive
tactics employed by law enforcement officers is a factual question for the
court to consider. Several cases map out this complex area of law
enforcement authority and its impact on voluntariness.
1. Assertions of Authority
Consent will likely be rendered involuntary by "an express or implied
false claim by [law enforcement] that they can immediately proceed to
[conduct a search] in any event." 70 For instance, in Bumper v. North
Carolina,71 law enforcement officers arrived at the home of an elderly
woman, suspecting her live-in grandson for rape. Officers announced that
they had a warrant to search the home, but never stated that the
grandson was a suspect. 72 Without hesitation, the woman allowed the
officers to conduct their search. Subsequently, officers found a rifle that
was used to arrest and prosecute the grandson. The Government chose
to rely exclusively on the grandmother's consent, instead of the warrant,
to support admission of the rifle. 73 Although some evidence was
introduced showing that the officers did possess a search warrant, that
warrant was never returned and the Supreme Court was left to speculate
as to the conditions of its issuance. 74

67. Id.
68. Id. at 1352-53; see also United States v. Thompson, 712 F.2d 1356, 1360-61 (11th
Cir.1983) (explaining that retention of documents weighs significantly on the question of
whether a seizure has occurred).
69. See generally LAFAVE, supranote 3, at §§ 8.2(m)-(n).
70. Id. at § 8.2(a).
71. 391 U.S. 543 (1968).
72. At no point during the interaction did law enforcement inform the elderly woman
that her grandson was a suspect for a crime. Id. at 547.
73. Id. at 546-47.
74. Id. at 550 n.15. Furthermore, since the Government made the decision to rely
exclusively on the consent of the grandmother, and no evidence of a warrant was present
in the record, the Court did not have to consider the validity of the warrant. See id.
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The Court reasoned that the officers had deceived the grandmother by
making an assertion of authority that they may or may not have had. 75
Any assertion of authority-for example, the proclamation of a warrant
that is ultimately nonexistent or invalid-by law enforcement is coercive
because the officer is, in effect, announcing that the individual has no
right to resist the search.76 Thus, there is no voluntary consent when a
law enforcement officer attempts to deceive an individual through an
assertion of authority.77
2. Assertion of False Exigent Circumstances
Introduction of facts making consent seemingly essential weighs
heavily for a finding of involuntariness.7 8 For instance, in United States
7 9 agents conducted a "knock and talk" at a residence,
v. Harrison,
identifying themselves as law enforcement officers investigating a report
of a bomb and asking if they could search the apartment." The
individual, at first uncertain, eventually gave consent to a search. During
the search, agents found a loaded handgun.8 1 The United States Court of
Appeals for the Tenth Circuit held that misrepresentations in the nature
of an investigation, for the purpose of gaining cooperation, entry, and
consent to search, are to be considered in the voluntariness analysis. 82
Furthermore, the court was extremely wary of the deceptive tactic used
because it created the impression that physical danger would result
should the individual refuse to consent to a search." As a result, any
misrepresentation designed to create a sense of urgency by leaving the

75. Id. at 548-50, 549 n.14. As such, because the grandmother never gave valid consent
to the search, the rifle was improperly admitted against the grandson in the case against
him for rape. Id. at 550.
76. Id. at 548-50.
77. Id. at 550.
78. LAFAVE, supra note 3, at § 8.2(n).
79. 639 F.3d 1273 (10th Cir. 2011).
80. The agents were members of the Bureau of Alcohol, Tobacco, and Firearms (ATF).
The agents became suspicious after reports that the suspect owed a substantial amount of
money to an arms dealer and was selling drugs from the apartment. The agents decided to
conduct the "knock and talk" because they lacked probable cause to obtain a search
warrant. Furthermore, the plainclothes agents displayed badges around their necks. Id. at
1275-76.
81. Id.
82. Id. at 1278-79.
83. Id. at 1279. Although neither of the agents actually told the suspect that he was in
danger, that was the overall effect of their statements. Id. at 1281.
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impression that the individual has no right to refuse a search because of
the potential for physical harm renders consent involuntary. 84
3. Assertions made During Undercover Operations
Although considered in the voluntariness analysis, the concealment of
a law enforcement officer's identity does not generally vitiate the
voluntariness of a suspect's consent to disclose criminal activity to an
undercover officer. 85 For example, in Lewis v. United States,86 an
undercover law enforcement agent misrepresented and concealed his
identity to purchase narcotics from a suspect. The suspect, unknowingly
interacting with an undercover narcotics agent, invited and admitted the
agent to his home. The two discussed the current transaction, the
potential for future sales, and then moved to the front porch where the
agent gave the suspect fifty dollars for a package containing five bags of
marijuana. Two weeks later, the agent contacted the suspect to setup
another transaction and was again invited to the home. The agent again
paid fifty dollars, this time receiving a package with six bags of
marijuana.8 7
84. Id. To date, the Eleventh Circuit has not considered a case involving exigent
circumstances. However, in United States v. Vazquez-Velazquez, No. 1:11-CR-212-TCBGGB, 2012 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 35867 (N.D. Ga. 2012), DEA agents from South Carolina had
evidence that a target of their investigation visited a Marietta home, suspected of
containing drugs. Subsequently, DEA agents conducted a "knock and talk." After the target
answered the door, a DEA agent represented that the agents were there to investigate a
kidnapping, displaying pictures of the purported kidnapping victim. Additionally, the agent
asked if they could enter the home to talk about the kidnapping. The kidnapping was
completely fictional and created for the sole purpose of attempting to gain entry to the
home. Once inside the house, the target consented to a search of the house for the
kidnapping victim. Eventually, after using a canine unit, the DEA agents discovered drugs
and arrested the occupants of the house. Id. at *2-8.
The United States District Court for the Northern District of Georgia found the
entry into the Marietta home unlawful because the consent was involuntary. Id. at *22.
Specifically, the court found that the agents had implied that they needed the help of the
individuals to locate a kidnapping victim. Id. at *21. From the representations of the agents,
the occupants of the home could have reasonably concluded that any failure on their part
to admit the law enforcement agents '"would hinder or delay . . . efforts to resolve safely
(what appeared to be) a grave emergency about which the authorities were sufficiently
concerned' that they sent numerous armed law enforcement officers to investigate." Id. The
individuals of the home were effectively coerced into consenting because the deception
created a sense of urgency, instilling the impression that the individuals did not have the
ability to refuse without the kidnapping victim succumbing to some sort of physical harm.
Id. at *21-22.
85. See LAFAVE, supra note 3, at § 8.2(m).
86. 385 U.S. 206 (1966).
87. Id. at 207-08. There was apparently some discussion between the individual and
the undercover officer about the possibility for incentives should the undercover officer
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The Supreme Court recognized a long history of affording law
enforcement officers the ability to use deceptive tactics to conduct
investigations.8 8 Additionally, the Court found persuasive the suspect's
willingness to invite strangers into his home, provided only that they
were ready, able, and willing to purchase narcotics.89 Similarly, the Court
reasoned that holding undercover operations unconstitutional because of
deceit would severely hamper the ability of law enforcement to conduct
investigations and thwart crime.9 0 The Court held that law enforcement
may conceal their identity and accept invitations to a suspect's dwelling
for purposes of conducting business as contemplated by the suspect
without invalidating the voluntariness of the suspect's consent.9 1
4. Assertions and Omissions of True or Full Affiliation
The effect of deception as to a law enforcement agent's affiliation has
had mixed conclusions. 92 On one hand, in United States v. Tweel, 93 an
individual was audited by the Internal Revenue Service (IRS). 94 The
individual's accountant, to determine whether his client was again under
criminal investigation for a second time, asked whether a special agent
was involved.95 The revenue agent stated that no special agent was
assigned, implying the nonexistence of a criminal investigation and
leading the individual to consent to the audit. Nevertheless, the revenue
make future purchases. Id. The suspect was arrested and charged with two counts of
narcotics violations, specifically relating to the sale and transfer of marijuana. Id. at 208.
88. Id. at 208-09.
89. Id. at 210. The suspect was not concerned with the true or concealed identity of his
potential buyer, but merely his ability to make a profit, the ability of that buyer to pay, and
the potential for future business with the buyer. At no time during the agent's presence in
the residence "did the agent see, hear, or take anything that was not contemplated, and in
fact intended, by [the suspect] as a necessary part of his illegal business." Id.
90. Id.
91. Id. at 211-12.
92. LAFAVE, supra note 3, at § 8.2(n) n.419.
93. 550 F.2d 297 (5th Cir. 1977).
94. Nicholas J. Tweel was the subject of two separate and unrelated IRS audits. First,
Tweel was audited for his federal income tax returns for the years 1958 through 1963. This
earlier audit had involved a special agent, who eventually withdrew from the case because
no criminal action was to be pursued against Tweel. However, under this first audit, Tweel
was still investigated for civil sanctions. Shortly after the conclusion of the first audit,
Tweel was once again audit in May of 1969, this time for his federal income tax returns for
the years 1966 through 1968. Following the conclusion of the 1969 audit, Tweel was
convicted on two counts of tax evasion for the years 1967 and 1969. He was also convicted
on two counts of making false statements related to those years. Id. at 298.
95. The accountant for the individual, Ben A. Bagby, apparently knew that, while
revenue agents were generally involved in audits, special agents were only involved in
audits potentially culminating in criminal investigation and prosecution. Id.
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agent knew the audit had been initiated at the "request of the Organized
Crime and Racketeering Section of the Department of Justice [(DOJ),]"
which investigates individuals for criminal liability. Furthermore, the
agent did, in fact, turn over documents from the audit to the DOJ.96
The United States Court of Appeals for the Fifth Circuit recognized
that taxpayers have a right to know that an audit may result in criminal
liability.9 7 Additionally, the tax system requires revenue agents to rely
on the good faith of taxpayers to conduct investigations, which equally
allows taxpayers to expect the same good faith from the Government.98
With this understanding, the court reasoned that the revenue agent, in
light of the targeted question by the individual's accountant, failed to
properly and fully disclose the potential for criminal liability. 9 Likewise,
the court determined that the revenue agent's copying and delivering of
microfilm to the DOJ evidenced his intent to deliberately deceive the
individual.10 0 The court refused to condone such a shocking display of
deception by the IRS, finding the consent involuntary. 101
On the other hand, in United States v. Wuagneux,102 the IRS audited
a corporation. The investigator identified himself as a revenue agent, yet
failed to further disclose that he was a member of the IRS strike force
group. 10s Furthermore, no evidence showed that the DOJ initiated the
investigation. The chief executive officer was subsequently convicted "of
operating [his] business through a pattern of racketeering activit[ies.]"1 0 4
The Eleventh Circuit refused to invalidate the consent as there were no
affirmative acts or omissions by the agent rising to the level of coercion. 105

96. Id. Bagby apparently had additional documents relating to the individual's audit
that he voluntarily presented to the revenue agent after the representation that no special
agent was involved. The revenue agent microfilmed all records that were given to him by
both the individual being audited and his accountant. Id.
97. Id. at 299.
98. Id. at 300.
99. Id. at 299.
100. Id. The court went on to say that the deception was in flagrant disregard of the
individual's rights. Id.
101. Id. at 300. The court remanded the case for further determination as to the evidence
tainted by the deception that rendered the consent involuntary. Id.
102. 683 F.2d 1343 (11th Cir. 1982).
103. The IRS strike force group is maintained in the audit division of the IRS, and is
wholly independent of the DOJ Crimes Strike Force (CSF). Id. at 1347. The IRS strike force
group handles complex and specialized examinations. As such, the IRS strike force group
subsequently changed their name to the IRS Special Enforcement Group (SEG). Id.
104. Id. at 1345-47. Upon suspicious findings that might lead to criminal liability, the
IRS strike force group forwards information to the CSF. However, a relatively small portion
of the IRS strike force group's cases are actually forwarded to the CSF. Id. at 1347.
105. Id. at 1347-48.
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Ultimately, the court held that individuals encounter law enforcement
officers at their own risk, understanding that evidence of criminal
activity may be discovered and result in criminal liability.106
C. Motivation, Subjective Intent, and Pretext
1. Motivation and Subjective Intent of Law Enforcement
Officers Irrelevant
The voluntariness analysis concerns only what the suspect knows or
does, and is independent of intentions or motivations of the individual
law enforcement officers. 0 7 Said differently, the subjective motivations
of law enforcement officers are irrelevant to the voluntariness of a
suspect's consent. 0 8 For example, in Illinois v. Perkins,09 detectives,
dressed as inmates, entered the cell of a presently incarcerated
individual. The detectives were exploring suspicions about an unrelated
murder.11 0 To gain credit with the prisoner, the detectives agreed to a
plan for escape. The prisoner unwittingly disclosed to his cellmatedetectives that he had murdered a man named Stephenson-the
unrelated murder victim."' The Supreme Court reasoned that strategic
deception is vitally different from coercion.1 12 Specifically, coercion is
determined from the perspective of the suspect, making the motivation
1 13
or subjective intent of law enforcement officers irrelevant.
106. Id. at 1348.
107. United States v. Prudden, 424 F.2d 1021, 1033 (5th Cir. 1970).
108. United States v. Farley, 607 F.3d 1294, 1330 (11th Cir. 2010). "It does not matter
if [law enforcement] deliberately lie[ to [a suspect] about the subject of the[ir] investigation
in order to trick him into [consenting to a search] they thought he might not otherwise have
[consented to]." Id.
109. 496 U.S. 292 (1990).
110. Law enforcement became interested in Perkins for the murder of a man named
Stephenson when a former inmate mentioned that Perkins had detailed the Stephenson
murder. His recounting of the murder specifically included various details not well known
to the public. Perkins was serving a sentence for aggravated battery unrelated to the
Stephenson murder. Id. at 294.
111. Id. at 295.
112. Id. at 297. Importantly, strategic deception does not involve the elements of
compulsion or coercion necessary to invalidate otherwise voluntary consent. Ploys aimed at
misleading and lulling a suspect into a false sense of security typically do not involve
elements of compulsion or coercion. Therefore, such ploys are not the concern of the Fourth
Amendment. Cellmates generally do not have legal authority to compel answers to
questions, and here, the inmate had no feeling that his cellmate-detectives could force him
to say anything. The inmate saw his cellmate-detectives as equals and, propelled
exclusively by a desire to impress them, recounted the graphic details of his murder of
Stephenson. Id. at 298.
113. Id. at 296.
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Consequently, the Court determined that a prisoner would unlikely feel
compelled, out of fear, to disclose information about a murder to other
individuals he thinks are also prisoners. 114 Ultimately, the Court was
unwilling to invalidate the voluntariness of the prisoner's statements. 115
2. Pretext does not Necessarily Invalidate a Search
Consent gained under pretext does not automatically render consent
involuntary. 11 6 For instance, in Whren v. United States,117 a car was
pulled over in a high drug area, by an unmarked police car.118 Upon
approaching the vehicle, the plainclothes officers saw what looked like
bags of cocaine and the occupants were immediately arrested.1 19 The
Supreme Court determined that while the traffic stop was a pretext to
stopping the car and discovering drugs, the pretext did not affect the
constitutionality of the search.120 Specifically, the Court reasoned that if
another officer could have objectively pulled the car over, the pretext did
not infringe upon the individual's constitutional rights. 121
D. Cooperation of a Suspect Distinguishedfrom Undercover Operations
Interactions with known law enforcement officers, when compared to
encounters with undercover agents, are inherently different for the
purpose of determining voluntariness.122 Specifically, in obvious
encounters with law enforcement officers attempting to gain cooperation,
suspects are implicitly informed of the risk their interaction may have
in
Nonetheless,
individuals
regarding
criminal
liability. 123
administrative situations are entitled to rely on the representations of
the government. 124 Alternatively, individuals unwittingly encountering

114. Id. at 296-97.
115. Id. at 300.
116. 1 LAFAVE, supra note 3, at § 1.4(f).
117. 517 U.S. 806 (1996).
118. Officers stopped the car after observing suspicious activity. Specifically, the officers
observed the car making an extended stop at a stop sign, the driver looking down into his
lap, and the vehicle speeding off suddenly without signaling and at an unreasonable speed.
Additionally, the vehicle had a temporary license plate and contained youthful occupants.
Id. at 808.
119. Id. at 808-09.
120. Id. at 818.
121. Id. at 815.
122. Harrison, 639 F.3d at 1278.
123. Id.
124. SEC v. ESM Government Securities, Inc., 645 F.2d 310, 316 (5th Cir. 1981) ('When
a government agent presents himself to a private individual, and seeks that individual's
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undercover agents are not privy to the same notice and may unwisely
trust an individual that later turns out to be law enforcement. 125
Individuals encountering undercover agents are not entitled to the same
protections because they obviously would have freely and voluntarily
consented to the same conduct in a similar situation without the
undercover agent. 126 Nevertheless, under both types of encounters, the
ultimate determination regarding voluntariness still remains: whether
the interaction and deception used was fraught with compulsion or
coercion.127

IV. Court's Rationale
In United States v. Spivey,128 the Eleventh Circuit considered
whether any deception by law enforcement unavoidably invalidates
an individual's voluntary consent to search their home.1 29 The
circumstances involved known law enforcement agents affirmatively
concealing and misrepresenting their full identity and purpose for
entering the home.13 0 In a 2-1 decision, the court determined a
deceptive ruse does not necessarily invalidate voluntary consent. 13
Circuit Judge William Pryor wrote for the majority, with Judge
Martin dissenting.1 32

cooperation based on his status as a government agent, the individual should be able to rely
on the agent's representations.").
125. Harrison, 639 F.3d at 1278.
126. See, e.g., United States v. Centennial Builders, Inc., 747 F.2d 678 (11th Cir. 1984).
In Centennial Builders, an IRS agent conducted an undercover investigation of an
individual, during which the agent had a meeting with the individual. During the meeting,
the agent gathered information relating to the individual's business. Suspicious, the
individual questioned the IRS agent, directly asking him to disclose whether he was an IRS
agent. The agent denied being an IRS agent. The agent then later submitted summonses
to several institutions for records relating to the individual. Id. at 680. The Eleventh Circuit
reasoned that the individual had willfully encountered the undercover agent and took the
risk that any information he freely gave could be used against him. Id. at 683. Under this
sort of encounter, the suspect has no expectation of privacy. Id. Additionally, undercover
law enforcement agents are not required to reveal their identity upon questioning, as this
would effectively eliminate undercover operations. Id.
127. See, e.g., Perkins, 496 U.S. at 296-97; Harrison, 639 F.3d at 1279.
128. 861 F.3d 1207 (11th Cir. 2017).
129. Id. at 1210.
130. Id. at 1211.
131. Id. at 1218-19.
132. Id. at 1210, 1218.
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A. The Majority Opinion
Using the legal background and precedent outlined above, the
majority described the impact of deceit on the voluntariness of
consent. 188 Almost immediately, the majority homed in on the
dichotomy between undercover operations on the one hand and
cooperative operations with suspects on the other.1 34 The majority
found it persuasive that law enforcement officers are given leeway in
their interactions to deceive individuals-primarily in undercover
operations where the suspect has no knowledge of the agent's
identity-to state that "[n]ot all deception prevents an individual
from making an essentially free and unconstrained choice." 135
Moreover, limiting the opinion in United States v. Tweell3 6 to the
administrative context,1 37 the court considered United States v.
especially
that
taxpayers,
Wuagneux,138 which
recognized
businessmen, must accept the fact that an innocent interaction with
law enforcement may turn into criminal charges and liability.1 39 The
court followed this rationale at the cornerstone of the opinion,
announcing that all individuals who initiate interactions with law

133. Id. at 1213-14.
134. Id. After introducing the category of cases relating to assertions of authority and
assertions of false exigent circumstances, the majority never fully discussed the
applicability of these categories of cases to the principle case. See generally id. at 1213-18.
135. Id. at 1214 (internal quotations omitted). Furthermore, the majority also found
persuasive the long line of cases establishing the ability and authority of law enforcement
to use deceptive tactics during interrogations and interactions with suspects to gain
confessions under the Fifth Amendment, specifically relying on Perkins. Id. Such
interactions, like that of the principle case, generally involve knowing interactions with law
enforcement officers. See Perkins, 496 U.S. at 297 ("Ploys to mislead a suspect or lull him
into a false sense of security that do not rise to the level of compulsion or coercion to speak
are not within Miranda's concerns."); see also United States v. Peters, 153 F.3d 445, 463
(7th Cir. 1998) (Easterbrook, J., concurring) ("If a misunderstanding of one's status as a
target-misunderstanding abetted by calculated silence and half-truths from agents and
prosecutors-does not invariably make a statement involuntary, why should it make a
disclosure of physical evidence involuntary?").
136. 550 F.2d 297 (5th Cir. 1977).
137. Spivey, 861 F.3d at 1213-14. The court noted that Tweel has been limited in its
reach, never being applied in a situation where the suspects knew of the nature of the
criminal investigation. Id. Specifically, the obligation for law enforcement agentsespecially IRS revenue agents conducting audits-to disclose the potential for criminal
liability exists only when in administrative investigations. Id.
138. 683 F.2d 1343 (11th Cir. 1982).
139. Spivey, 861 F.3d at 1213-14.
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enforcement take the calculated-although not entirely intelligentrisk of being found out for some criminal activity.1 40
Relying on Whren v. United States,141 the court quickly addressed
and dismissed the pretext argument raised by Spivey and Austin.142
Specifically, the court reasoned that because any law enforcement
agent could have objectively gone to the residence to follow up on the
burglary reports, the ruse was stripped of its subjective purpose. 143
Moreover, recognizing the factors enumerated in United States v.
Chemaly,1 44 the court considered the totality of the circumstances
analysis for voluntariness.1 45 Ultimately, the court determined that
all other factors of the analysis-aside from the presence of deceitpointed to a finding of voluntariness.146
Of major importance to the voluntariness determination by the
court was the fact that the couple had made the intentional,
deliberate, calculated, and purposeful decision to interact with law
enforcement.1 47 The couple knew they were engaged in criminal
activity, but were motivated to retrieve their fraudulently gained
property.1 48 Furthermore, even though the couple knew that the
house contained extensive evidence of credit-card fraud, they
admitted the agents into their home.149 As a result, the court held
that the ruse used by the agents was a relatively minor deception that

140. Id. at 1214. Here, the majority relied on the evidence showing that the individuals
knew they were interacting with law enforcement officers who had authority to act upon
evidence of criminal behavior. See id.
141. 517 U.S. 806 (1996).
142. Spivey, 861 F.3d at 1215. This is the closest that the majority comes to discussing
the applicability of assertion of authority cases. However, the discussion never goes beyond
the objective standard of whether some law enforcement could have gone to the home to
follow-up on the burglary reports. See id. This standard does not contemplate law
enforcement following up when they have no authority to investigate that particular report
in the first place.
143. Id.
144. 741 F.2d 1346 (11th Cir. 1984).
145. Spivey, 861 F.3d at 1215-16. The majority found the following facts persuasive: (1)
the couple invited the officers into the home; (2) the encounter was polite and cooperative;
(3) the officers were not required to inform the couple of their right to refuse consent; and
(4) the couple invited the interaction by filing burglary reports. Id.
146. Id. at 1215.
147. Id. at 1216. The court adopted the rationale of the district court, stating that
thieves usually, attempting to remain hidden, do not report that property they have
fraudulently gained has been stolen. Id.
148. Id.
149. Id.
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did not rise to the level of coercion. 150 Consequently, the court held
that, even outside of the undercover operations arena, not all
deception invalidates voluntary consent, especially when the suspect
makes the calculated choice to interact with law enforcement. 151
B. Judge Martin's Dissent
The impact of deceitful tactics on the broader public trust was the
focus of Judge Martin's dissent.152 The dissent noted that the agents
deceived Austin, claiming authority that they lacked. 153 SSA
Lanfersiek had no legal authority to investigate a burglary, and,
knowing that his presence might raise suspicions, pretended to be a
crime-scene technician to give the impression of lawful authority.154
Additionally, the dissent, also relying on Whren, attacked the
dismissal of the pretext argument by the majority. 155 Specifically, the
dissent reasoned that no law enforcement agent would have
objectively gone to a home to investigate a burglary that he knew was
officially closed by a neighboring police department. 156 Moreover, the
agents deliberately planned the ruse with upwards of ten other task
force members and, in the event the ruse did not work, had an
assistant state attorney waiting on standby to procure a warrant. 157
Finally, Austin's drastic change in behavior by refusing to cooperate
after discovering the ruse evidenced that she would not have
consented to the search initially had the agents fully disclosed their
intent. 15 8 The dissent found that the agents' tactics in this case
deliberately took advantage of the public trust of law enforcement

150. Id. at 1215. Effectively, the court's determination was that the deception employed
by the agents was "fair" given the underlying circumstances-specifically, that Spivey and
Austin had voluntarily encountered and invited the law enforcement agents into their home
to regain the fruits of their fraud that was stolen from them. See id.
151. Id. at 1218.
152. Id. at 1220-21 (Martin, J., dissenting).
153. Id. at 1221.
154. Id. The dissent explained that the USSS, and its agent, lacks the authority to
investigate simple burglaries. Id.
155. Id. at 1221-22. The dissent posits: how can it be objectively reasonable for law
enforcement to follow-up on a burglary report when they have no authority to investigate a
burglar in the first place? See id.
156. Id. The dissent reasoned that it would be wholly unreasonable for an objective law
enforcement officer to investigate a burglary that, while technically still open, was closed
by a neighboring police department and involves an arrested suspect that has confessed to
the crime. Id.
157. Id. at 1218-19, 1222.
158. Id. at 1222.
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engrained in Austin as a means of skirting constitutional protections
and safeguards. 5 9 Ultimately, the dissent warned against effectively
giving law enforcement a pass to side-step constitutional protection
and erode public trust.160
V. Implications
The law surrounding the issue of deceptive tactics employed by law
enforcement is an ever shifting and treacherous landscape. For every
court holding that law enforcement went too far, there is an equally
weighty opinion holding that deceptive tactics are permissible or even
encouraged.16 1 Professor LaFave best described this volatile area of
law by stating, "as unsettling as it may be . . . there is no surer test
62
to apply . . . tha[n] to ask [whether] the deception [was] 'fair."1

LaFave's cynical, and yet accurate, description of the law in this area
shows that courts look at deceptive tactics on a case-by-case basis,
asking whether the specific deception employed by law enforcement
officers was particularly "fair" under the circumstances. Yet, this
standard presents an unsettling question: when is deceptioncausing, explicitly or implicitly through acts or omissions, an
individual to believe something that is not true to gain some
advantage-ever fair?163
159. Id. at 1223. This view is enhanced by the holding of the majority that the couple
voluntarily consented because they "informed the police of the burglaries and invited their
interaction." Id. at 1216 (majority opinion).
160. See id. at 1223-24 (Martin, J., dissenting).
161. See generally LAFAVE, supra note 3, at § 8.2(n). In cases involving deception by law
enforcement officers, there is often a case-by-case assessment taken by the courts.
Furthermore, the circuit courts seem to be split on the impact of deception by law
enforcement officers on the voluntariness of consent. See David John Housholder, Notes,
Reconciling Consent Searches and Fourth Amendment Jurisprudence: Incorporating
Privacy into the Test for Valid Consent Searches, 58VAND. L. REV. 1279, 1291-94 (2005).
162. 4 LAFAVE, supra note 3, at § 8.2(n).
163. In some areas, deception is a perfectly acceptable and objectively reasonable
strategy or tactic. To illustrate, consider college football. The game of college football pits
two teams against one another in "battle" until one team emerges victorious. Teams use
their offense to march down the field and score points, while the other team uses their
defense to thwart any scoring possibility and get the ball back for their own offense. Yet,
when a team's opponent has a defense that is either equally matched to, or overpowering,
their offense, they must become creative in order to find scoring possibilities. Enter the
trick play.
Flea-flickers, play action passes, fake field goals or punts, and fumblerooskis have
long been developed and employed by college football teams on offense to try and keep their
opponent's defense honest and gain some sort of advantage. For example, with both the
flea-flicker and the play action pass, the offense will pretend to run the ball until the very
last possible second, and then, all of a sudden, seemingly out of nowhere, a huge pass. With
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Both the shifting landscape and unsettling question at central
issue in United States v. Spivey 64 are underscored by major
constitutional concerns surrounding the ability of individuals to
protect their home from unreasonable searches. 165 Evidencing the
seriousness of these important constitutional concerns is the fact that
the litigants in this case are willing to fight to the bitter end, even all
the way to the Supreme Court. 166
A denial of the petition for certiorari filed by Spivey and Austin,
would be an implicit affirmation of the key rationale of the Eleventh
Circuit's holding in Spivey. Particularly, the majority in Spivey

the play action pass, the ball never leaves the quarterback's hands. The quarterback, after
seemingly handing the ball to a tailback or running back for a run play, deceitfully hides
the ball for a few seconds, allowing the defense to attack the would-be runner, before
throwing the ball to an open receiver for a huge gain. Alternatively, with the flea-flicker,
the quarterback does, in fact, hand the ball off to the tailback or running back, who
seemingly shows run to the defense. However, just before crossing the blockers, the wouldbe runner stops and "flicks" the ball back to the quarterback for a huge pass down field.
These plays work because the deception lulls the defense into a false sense of securitythinking that they know the exact type of play the offense is running. Furthermore, a
properly executed trick play lurks in the back of every defensive player's mind for the rest
of the game, keeping them honest. And ultimately, the offense could score points to help
their lead in the game.
Deception in this context is completely appropriate, acceptable, and, more or less,
encouraged. While the opposing team and its fans may be frustrated and unhappy with the
ultimate outcome, as long as the play is properly executed-leaving no doubt as to the
legality of the play under the rules-all fans will find the play objectively reasonable and a
"fair" deception on the part of the offense. This showing of fair deception is not limited to
college football. Many other competitive sports have elements of deception; for instance, the
hidden-ball trick has long been used in baseball. Furthermore, examples of fair
deceptions-like deceiving children about the existence of a physical Santa Claus to instill
norms of good behavior-can be seen elsewhere in the human experience.
164. 861 F.3d 1207 (11th Cir. 2017).
165. See Brief of the Florida Association of Criminal Defense Lawyers as Amicus Curiae
in Support of Petitioners, Austin v. United States (No. 17-7046), 2018 WL 798787, at *11,
13 (U.S. Feb. 7, 2018) [hereinafter FACDL Amicus Brief]. The Florida Association of
Criminal Defense Lawyers (FACDL) argue that the reasonable-expectation-of-privacy test
does not take away from or eliminate the more traditional and historic property-based test
for Fourth Amendment violations. As such, the FACDL argues that traditional notions of
common law trespass apply. Id. Additionally, upon appeal to the Supreme Court the action
has been re-titled to Austin v. United States. Id.
166. See generally Petition for a Writ of Certiorari, Austin v. United States (No. 177046), (U.S. Dec. 11, 2017), available at https://www.supremecourt.gov/DocketPDF/17/177046/23306/20171211133726998_- Cert%2012-11%2OFINAL.pdf. At the time of publication,
no determination on the petition for certiorari was made. The Court extended the time for
the government to file a response to the petition until March 9, 2018. Results for Austin v.
United States, SUPREMECOURT.GOV, https://www.supremecourt.gov/search.aspx?filename
=/docket/docketfiles/html/public/17-7046.html (last visited Feb. 16, 2017).
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directly follows LaFave's "fairness" test. 167 It was seemingly fair to
deceive the couple because they were engaged in criminal activity.
Still, the established precedent represents a broadening of authority
for law enforcement to use deceptive tactics outside of undercover
operations. 6 8 However, while the outcome of punishing the couple for
their alleged crimes was arguably correct, the majority takes a major
precedential step that could negatively impact constitutional
protections and societal ideals for all individuals in several regards.
First, the majority, in essence, tells law enforcement that careful
planning permits the circumvention of constitutional protections,
especially the warrant process. 6 9 The litigation in this case could
have been avoided had the agents obtained a warrant rather than
deliberately planning to skirt the Fourth Amendment.1 70 The warrant
requirement is one safeguard allowing the judicial branch to protect
society from an over-reaching executive branch.171 Nevertheless, the
majority potentially gives law enforcement a blanket pass to forego
the stringent requirements of the Fourth Amendment for a cleverly
constructed ruse, even when there is ample probable cause to justify
a warrant.1 72 Additionally, the court tells law enforcement that such
side-stepping of the Fourth Amendment is permissible so long as it
would be "fair" to employ that deception against the suspect. This
confusing and illogical standard arguably creates a test where
deception is "fair" when the government pre-judges a suspect as
guilty and says that law enforcement may implement such tactics
merely because they are criminals.
Additionally, the majority places no limit on the ability of law
enforcement officers to employ such a ruse.17s Without proper
limitations or guidance from the courts, the potential exists for some
law enforcement agents to take the newly broadened authority well
beyond the intended limitations of the Founding Fathers.174 Under
the majority's precedent, law enforcement officers are given broad
authority to use deceptive tactics in any situation and by any means
167. See Spivey, 861 F.3d at 1216 (majority opinion).
168. Id. at 1224 (Martin, J., dissenting).
169. Id.
170. Id. at 1218.
171. 2 LAFAVE, supra note 3, at § 4.1(a).
172. When does the deception finally become "unfair" under the circumstances? This
pro-law enforcement, slippery slope created by the majority has potentially dangerous
consequences for the public and society at large. However, the opposite position, as argued
for by Spivey and Austin, presents just as many monumental concerns.
173. Spivey, 861 F.3d at 1224 (Martin, J., dissenting).
174. Id.
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that they, the law enforcement, deem reasonable and necessary. The
majority effectively takes the determination of voluntariness out of
the hands of the courts. This leaves law enforcement with the
authority to decide what is, or is not, an appropriate level of deception
to employ under the constitution.
Furthermore, the majority opinion allows law enforcement officers
to intrude and infringe upon the public trust delegated to them.17 5
Consent is used to justify more than 90% of all warrantless
searches.176 Law enforcement officers exist to protect and serve the
public in their communities. Many times, law enforcement agents are
entrusted with a broader public trust that allows them to gain
cooperation from citizens. 177 This giving of trust and cooperation
entitles the public to an exercise of good faith on the part of law
enforcement officers. LaFave again noted that "[a]ny departure from
the highest standards [embodied in our constitutional protections] . .. not
only fosters cynicism in the public at large, but a callousness in the
offic[er]s themselves [that] . .. is hard then to contain within the bounds
of the special need which is supposed to justify it."178 Allowing law
enforcement to encroach upon that trust through deception will only
hamper the already fragile citizen-police relationship. Furthermore,
each incident would further cause an erosion of the trust the public
has placed upon law enforcement. In a world already fraught with
controversy and rhetoric of distrusting law enforcement, broadening
the ability of law enforcement to violate what little trust they do have
is a dangerous precedent.
On the other hand, should the Court decide to grant the petition
for certiorari and hear the case, the discussion and debate over the
appropriateness of the use of deceptive tactics by law enforcement
officers is just beginning. The Court would be well within its
authority to reverse, finding that deceptive tactics are an overstep of
authority by law enforcement officers that intrudes upon the sanctity
of the home and the rights of individuals. In so holding, the likely

175. Id.
176. Richard Simmons, Not "Voluntary" but Still Reasonable: A New Paradigm for
Understandingthe Consent Searches Doctrine, 80 IND. L.J. 773, 773 (2005).
177. See Teri A. McMurtry-Chubb, #SayHerName #BlackWomensLivesMatter: State
Violence in Policing the Black Female Body, 67 MERCER L. REv. 651, 701 (2016).
"[U]ltimately 'the public confers legitimacy only on those they believe are acting in
procedurally just ways."' Id. (quoting Final Report of The President's Task Force on 21st
Century Policing, OFFICE OF COMMUNITY ORIENTED POLICING SERVICES:
WASHINGTON,
DC 1, 1 (May 2015), available at http://www.cops.usdoj.gov/
pdf/taskforce/taskforce-finalreport.pdf).
178. LAFAVE, supranote 3, at § 8.2(n).
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persuasive factors will be (1) the extremely delicate and fragile
relationship between citizens and law enforcement, and (2) the fear
of that relationship crumbling away due to shocking oversteps by law
enforcement. However, the possibility of an outright ban on the use
of deception to gain consent is minuscule. 179 This would cripple law
enforcement officers, ordering them to interact with criminals while
having one arm tied behind their back. In an area as sensitive and
fundamental as security in one's self, home, and property, no bright-line
rules should ever be employed.
Law enforcement have long been afforded the authority to employ
deception in a variety of contexts, including undercover operations
and interrogations. 180 As such, the far more likely determination by
the Court upon review would be to allow police to employ deception
to gain voluntary consent from suspects while placing some clear or
definitive limits on that ability. The goal is to protect serious
constitutional interests relating to the rights of individuals against
unreasonable searches and seizures, while affording law enforcement
officers the ability to properly and effectively conduct their job to
protect the interests of individuals from criminals. This goal is
immensely underscored by the current state of the country with
respect to the fragile-and in many regards, deterioratingrelationship between citizens and law enforcement officers. However,
under either scenario of an absolute rule regarding the use of deception,
society is the true victim. On the one hand, society will potentially be
unable to continue to trust law enforcement officers because of the
shocking employment of deceptive tactics by police, or, alternatively,
society will live in fear of criminals, as law enforcement officers are
required to stand idly by with their hands tied behind their back.

Alex G. Myers

179. The position, as argued for by Spivey and Austin, presents just as many
monumental concerns. Specifically, the couple argued that deception used to gain consent
is always "unfair," coercive, and violative of constitutional protections. See Spivey, 861 F.3d
at 1214-15 (majority opinion). Yet, a bright-line rule divesting law enforcement of authority
to use deception could have ripple effects into the areas of undercover operations and
confessions.

180. See, e.g., Perkins, 496 U.S. at 292; see also Peters, 153 F.3d at 445.

